Nail in the JKS coffin [Slides]
Tobias Ospelt (@floyd_ch, https://github.com/floyd-fuh/)
The Java Key Store (JKS) is the Java way of storing one or several cryptographic private and public keys for asymmetric cryptography in a file. While there are various key store formats, Java and Android still default to the JKS file format. JKS is one of the file formats for Java key stores, but JKS is confusingly used as the acronym for the general Java key store API as well. This presentation explains the security mechanisms of the JKS file format and how the password protection of the private key can be cracked. Due the unusual design of JKS the developed implementation can ignore the key store password and crack the private key password directly. Because it ignores the key store password, this implementation can attack every JKS configuration, which is not the case with most other tools. By exploiting a weakness of the Password Based Encryption scheme for the private key in JKS, passwords can be cracked very efficiently. Until now, no public tool was available exploiting this weakness. This technique was implemented in hashcat to amplify the efficiency of the algorithm with higher cracking speeds on GPUs.
How I met your browser: going incognito doesn’t hide your browsing from Ragamuffin [Slides]
Alessandro De Vito (@_cube0x8, https://github.com/MalfurionStormrage/)
Nowadays, the browser represents the gate between a human and its virtual world; all this makes it one of the most challenging attack vectors and a source of invaluable relevance during a forensic analysis.
Setting up persistent backdoors like a Russian spy
Gianni Gnesa (@GianniGnesa)
The past few years have witnessed a great number of data breaches, leaks and hacks. Most of whom have gone undetected for weeks, months, and in some cases even years. Considering the fact that many of the companies hit use state-of-the-art security products (e.g. Firewall, AV, IDS/IPS, SIEM, etc.), one cannot help but wonder: how can malicious hackers stay undetected for so long and what kind of software do they use to keep a foothold in their victims’ networks?
In this talk, we will try to answer both these questions by taking a look at two examples of persistent backdoors. One commonly used by penetration testers, the Meterpreter’s persistence.rb script, and another one discovered by Mandiant while analyzing the malicious tools of the Russian hacker group referred to as APT29.
The Social Networks of the Security Community [Slides]
Jeroen Massar (@jrmassar, https://github.com/massar)
The word Networking has two meanings in the ears of today’s computer engineer: the Internet and “social network”.
Both are dear to the heart of many in the audience, but often maintaining both up to an adequate level is a tricky affair as one already get too much fake news, updates and other information to read on a daily basis.
Receiving the right amount of information is a very important thing as getting too much information can cause either information overload (reload this page and check again 😉 and on the flip side it can cause filter bubbles if the breadth of information is too focused causing one to miss something that might actually have been important.
One important aspect of a good social network is that having proper connections in the social networks means that it will enable one to more easily reach out to others for help in the community when one needs detailed information or a direct contact to resolve an immediate answer.
The talk will discuss how various communities around the world enable such efficient communication and how one can become a part of these and how one should be participating in them. It will also cover how one can proactively setup communications to make sure that people who are not in one’s bubble know how to reach you too and which drink is preferred to be drunk at the events being organised.
Breaking security controls using subdomain hijacking [Slides]
Daniel Stirnimann (@seckle_ch, https://github.com/stirnim)
Todays Internet heavily makes use of DNS. Not only to communicate with a target host but also for retrieving additional information for a domain name. In fact, many security controls relay on DNS. Anti mail spoofing is one example which makes use of DNS zone records (e.g. SPF, DKIM, DMARC). Another example is domain validated TLS certi cates. One would think that given the importance of DNS that domain holders or administrators validate or monitor their zone content constantly. Unfortunately, this is far from the truth. The reality looks more like nobody cares about DNS, it’s biggest problem is that it finds a way to work even if it is heavily broken (e.g. misconfigured, forgotten hostnames, glue-record mismatch, etc.).
This presentation will show real world examples of subdomain hijacking with the consequence of breaking security controls used by the domain names. We show how to break DMARC policies or issue TLS certificates or simply hijack a subdomain for high profile domain names.
We discuss how we can use open data on the Internet to get a glimpse on DNS records for any domain name. We also present a tool to validate your own zone which can be used by administrators to detect abandoned hostnames.
Triple Play – Triple Fail
Antoine Neuenschwander (@ant0inet)
By the end of this year, Swisscom plans to shut down the venerable Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) in Switzerland. In a considerable endeavour of technical operations and marketing campaigns, telcos are currently migrating bulks of analog telephone and ISDN subscribers to so-called ‘All IP’. Voice telephony, HDTV and broadband Internet; from now on this trinity of services shall be provided solely over the Internet Protocol, decoupling the services from
their corresponding access medium, be it copper, cable or fibre.
The plain old telephone service is now over a hundred years old, and cable TV is also rather antiquated; taking this step is economically and technologically worthwhile. However, as obsolete as they are today, these technologies have evolved to become as reliable and secure as can be. Do you remember Phreakers and Pay-TV crackers? Introducing new ‘All IP’ services naturally bears certain risks, as for all new technologies they have yet to mature.
Last fall I upgraded my link from a landline with DSL to FTTH and at the same time I also switched to ‘All IP’. My ISP provides the terminal equipment to the customers. It features several ports to connect phones, computers and TV, and the fibre WAN port. I was curious about the device’s operation, so I invested some time to look at the communication on the WAN port, and I did find a phreakin’ vulnerability…