Talks and abstracts
Sanaz Yashar is a senior manager at Mandiant. In this role, she assists EMEA government agencies and commercial organizations in uncovering today’s most advanced threats, while also providing feedback on the various threats specifically targeting the Middle East.
Her holistic analysis provides organizations a strategic level of insight into the potential operational impact of advanced threats, while also providing hands-on hunting and remediation recommendations.
Prior to joining Mandiant, Sanaz was director of threat intelligence at an Israeli cybersecurity company. She has over 15 years’ experience with the Israel Defense Forces, working within the elite intelligence unit, specializing in variety of novel cyber operations.
Her experience as an Intelligence officer, combined with her Middle Eastern background, allows Sanaz to provide a unique kind of threat analysis from the attacker’s point of view and mindset to give a focused, proactive solutions.
Sanaz was born in Tehran, Iran and immigrated to Israel, where she earned her Bachelor of Science degree from Tel Aviv University and MBA degree from Ben Gurion University.
Surviving “Agile” as a security team (and become friends with the DevOps crowd)
DevOps and agile processes have proven efficient and are here to stay. Security teams are mostly still very skeptical as they have to act as gatekeepers and don’t have enough resources to keep up with the increased speed of changes. This causes friction between DevOps and security teams. This talk will dig deeper into the mindset of DevOps teams, how they function, what the security teams can do to support them (and the other way around) and what needs to change in order for the security teams to not stand in the way of DevOps, but rather be a part of it and get true DevSecOps going.
Bio: Sven Vetsch – @disenchant
Co-Founder and Head of Security Research at Redguard. Mainly into application security for the last 15+ years. Currently focusing on “agile security”, DevSecOps as well as container and Kubernetes security.
Windows Hardening – How hard can it be?
The default settings of Windows are not secure. Security as well as privacy settings have to be defined and implemented by users and administrators or companies themselves. Microsoft offers different ways to configure a (secure) system, traditionally via group policies, in the cloud age with Intune. There are thousands of settings with multiple choices. It takes an awful lot of time and effort to find out which of these settings are necessary and what the impact of them is. So that not everyone has to reinvent the wheel, there are various guidelines such as Microsoft Security Baseline, CIS Benchmark or BSI SiSyPHuS. In the talk, we will discuss how these guidelines differ and how to proceed to define one’ s own policy. We also try to shed light on how you create your own guideline and what you need to look out for.
However, the definition of policies is only one side of the coin. We also want to check whether the predefined configuration has been correctly and completely applied to a system. Further we need a tool to analyse and evaluate the configuration of a system. There are several ways to do this and there are challenges. One option is to use standard tools such as the Policy Analyzer or the analysis of group policy reports. HTML or XML reports must be parsed and assessed. We talk about our experiences and pains with this procedure. For systems that have not been configured via a central system, the group policy report falls short and standard tools do not provide all the data for a complete analysis. Therefore, we decided to develop our own tool. All the settings must be gathered, interpreted and evaluated from various sources such as the registry, audit policy or user right assignment. When evaluating settings, other pitfalls arise, such as the language of the operating system or what the question what score is given for the result.
Bio: Mirjam Blumenstein – @cyberminza
Mirjam Blumenstein works in the field of Information Security Management since 2013, first as an audit manager for a large German hosting provider, later as a consultant for the development and implementation of ISMSs. Currently she works as Research assistant at ZHAW, where she also earned her master’s degree in Computer Science. During this time, she started to teach about the fundamentals of Information security management and ISO 27001. She now spends most of her free time with her toddler twins.
Bio: Michael Schneider – @0x6d69636b
Michael Schneider is working in information security since 2010. He works at scip AG as a penetration tester and head of auditing. He is an expert at penetration testing, hardening and the detection of vulnerabilities in operating systems. He is well-known for a variety of tools written in PowerShell to find, exploit, and mitigate weaknesses. In his free time, he is a driver of classic cars with Team Paddy Murphy.
Malware, Zero Days, and PLCs, Oh Boy!
While researching Automation Direct’s DirectLogic 06 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), an active ecosystem of industrial password “cracking” software was discovered targeting a range of different industrial devices (PLCs, Human-Machine Interfaces, and PLC project files) and vendors. Analysis of a specific variant targeting DirectLogic PLCs indicated that no cracking was done, rather the software utilized a zero day exploit to retrieve the PLC password and present it to the operator. Even worse, the software acted as a malware dropper for the Sality virus – an old, yet still effective botnet typically used for distributed computing tasks such as password spraying, cracking, denial-of-service attacks, and cryptocurrency mining. In this talk, we will go over the analysis and reverse engineering of this malware at a high level – static and dynamic techniques and tools used that made the analysis easier and defeated anti-analysis techniques. We will discuss the zero day exploit that was embedded in the malware dropper and how we crafted a significantly more severe version based off the original. We will also talk about the history of the Sality malware and how it’s evolved over time. Finally, we will discuss the industrial password “cracking” ecosystem, how the threat actors advertises their malware on the internet, features of the malware and what that implies about the threat actors motivations, and the consequences of an infection in an industrial environment.
Bio: Sam Hanson – @secureloon
Sam Hanson is a Vulnerability Analyst at Dragos, inc where he has been researching vulnerabilities and malware targeting our critical infrastructure for the past 2.5 years. Prior to Dragos, Sam was a student at the University of Minnesota – Twin Cities where he studied Computer Science.
Binary code as a searchable IOC
Many types of IOCs are searchable and a range of technologies exist to do so. Its benefits are to support rapid incident response, confirm or exclude breaches, detection and identification of attacks, amongst others.
The types of IOCs that are searchable are usually textual data, like application logs, network or host indicators, hashes of files, etc.
In this talk we are going to explore the question of: what if binary code is a searchable IOC?
We will present use cases where binary code search technologies enhances existing threat intelligence and malware analysis processes and makes entirely new ones possible.
More concretely, we will show how code search technology can:
Increase detection and identification resilience by focusing on fine-grained code similarities of changing malware threats Given a binary file, hunt through millions of binaries for similar files, as you would with log lines, IPs, hashes, etc. Track the evolution of malware families at large scale and identify changes over time in an automated manner Provide contextual information by uncovering relations between unknown binary files and known binaries files from intelligence sources We will showcase these approaches with the following, amongst others, examples of real-world threats:
Detecting recent code changes of IcedIDs GZipLoader component Hunting for undetected BumbleBee loader variants Tracking the multi-year long evolution of Qbot by analysing over 500k samples The contents of this talk are based on many years of actively developing and using code search technology on real-world malware threats.
Bio: Carlos Rubio
Carlos Rubio is a malware researcher at Threatray, where he is mainly responsible for reverse engineering malware to automate the detection process of new threats. In addition to researching new applications for code reuse technology that can help in different areas such as threat hunting, incident response, tracking the evolution of malware families, among others. He previously worked on reverse-engineering malware at Blueliv, S21sec Counter Threat Intelligence Unit and in the Panda Security Adaptive Defense team. He has previously spoken at Botconf (2022, 2019), Virus Bulletin localhost 2020, as well as many closed-door private conferences.
Bio: Jonas Wagner – @_jwagner
Jonas Wagner is the co-founder and CTO of Threatray and has built the technological foundation of its code search engine based on years of research and development. He holds a Masters Degree in Cybersecurity from the Bern University of Applied Sciences. He has previously spoken at BSides Zürich (2019), DFRWS (2017) and many private events.
Finding Malicious artifacts in the Wild West OSS supply-chain
In this talk we will break down the approach we have produced at Snyk to automate the continuous detection of malicious artifacts across various open source ecosystems to overall improve the state of software with a reliance on third party dependencies. We will dive into our methodology and analysis pipeline which leverages a combination of static and dynamic analysis to highlight signals indicating malicious behavior deep within scanned artifacts, before presenting a subset of our findings revealing the most common type of malware found, what kinds of data is being exfiltrated, and the signals used for detection. Our results have uncovered sophisticated malware going far beyond the expected cryptominers, revealing targeted attacks leveraging dependency confusion, through to artifacts deploying commercial malware in developer workstations and application containers. We will then go into some specifics from a targeted dependency confusion attack we identified within the NPM ecosystem showing how such attacks are actually used in the wild, before finally presenting our follow-up work and next steps.
Participants will expect to come away from the talk with:
An overview of the current threats to Supply Chain Security with a focus on OSS How we have developed our custom malware detection pipeline The general results and common malware types in open source package repositories How we played Among Us with an adversary setting up a honeypot targeted malware which resulted in a surprising twist! What future work Snyk are performing to detect more malware and help clean up repos! In the breakout session we host an interactive session where dive deep into the reverse engineering process and results from the custom malware from the previously mentioned targeted dependency confusion campaign, followed by an open discussion regarding additional details on our ongoing future detection efforts, areas of improvement, follow-up research and general Q&A.
Bio: Elliot Ward
Elliot is a security researcher @ Snyk, with many years working on application security and offensive security topics. Elliot is from the United Kingdom but has been living in Zurich now for 5 years. He enjoys hacking, craft beer, cats, skateboarding and snowboarding.
A Tale of Securing Containerized Workloads at Scale
In this talk, we tell the story of how we secure our containerized workloads at Datadog. We start by laying out the real-world threats to Kubernetes environments in 2022, showcasing some recent incidents and malware in the wild, as well as challenges in securing containers’ supply chain and ensuring their provenance. Then, we dive into the approaches we evaluated and took to gain visibility and ensure no dangerous workloads run in our clusters – which, unsurprisingly, is not straightforward when your “customer” is a fast-moving engineering team of more than a 1’000 engineers. We discuss how using the same, consistent rule set across different stages of the deployment lifecycle helps gaining consistency and trust from other teams. In particular, we showcase how to treat security rules as code, including with tests and a continuous integration (CI) pipeline, and discuss how to balance the “cost of false positives”‚ with the “risk of false negatives” depending on the environment you operate in.
Throughout the talk, we advocate for a pragmatic, threat-informed and risk-based approach to securing Kubernetes clusters without the hype. For every rule we implement, it’s critical that we, as security engineers, are able to demonstrate the attacks it prevents or detects backed with real-world data. We also discuss the operating model of providing security “as a platform”, acting as enablers for engineering teams to ship secure workloads fast.
No matter whether you run one or a hundred clusters, you will walk away with actionable insights on how – and especially why – to secure containerized workloads in an engineering-heavy environment.
Bio: Tommy McCormick – @jan0ski_
Tommy works as a security engineer at Datadog. He’s passionate about threat detection and securing containerized workloads, applying pragmatic, threat-informed security controls at scale and ensuring that “shifting security left” isn’t just a buzzword.