


5G Deployment Types



5G Networks – Future in 2030?

Vehicle to drive digitalization phase & realize a gigabit networked-society!




National Critical Infrastructure!



Let's look into 5G Architecture & Security




Architecture in General



Note: picture provides an abstract view only



Evolution in 5G Architecture






5G Security Issues




Increased Attack Surface





Increased Attack Surface






History of incidents – Greek Wiretapping Scandal

29 Jun 2007 | 14:07 GMT

The Athens Affair

How some extremely smart hackers pulled off the most audacious cell-network break-in ever

By Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis Spinellis



Source: The Intercept



History of incidents – Configurational/Operational mistakes

SS7 SIGNALERING

- Et ondsinnet angrep mot ville hatt samme konsekvens

Havariet fredag skjedde via en sårbar protokoll fra 1970-tallet.



AV: MARIUS JØRGENRUD | TELE

TELE-KOMMUNIKASJON

PUBLISERT: 22. FEB. 2016 - 13:57



Source: nntb.no



History of incidents – SNOWDEN NSA Briefcase

OTA, master key Ki, ...


Now eSIM!!





Security challenges...

✓ 5G as an emerging signal intelligence platform for collecting and processing telemetry data → surveillance from cyber enemies








Security challenges...

✓ Denial of Service / Distributed Denial of Service attack protection



Average wired broadband speed

Rank	Country	Average Download Speed (Mbps)	Total Tests	Time To Download HD Movie (5GB)
1	Singapore	60.39	524,018	11 Mins, 18 Secs
2	Sweden	46.00	367,241	14 Mins, 50 Secs
3	Denmark	43.99	150,529	15 Mins, 31 Secs
4	Norway	40.12	86,920	17 Mins, 01 Secs
5	Romania	38.60	175,948	17 Mins, 41 Secs

Source: Fastmetrics



5G Security challenges & discoveries...

✓ Data privacy issues (vulnerabilities in the 5G access network)

New vulnerabilities in 4G and 5G cellular access network protocols: exposing device capabilities

Altaf Shaik (Technische Universität Berlin, Germany); Ravishankar Borgaonkar (SINTEF Digital, Norway); Shinjo Park and Jean-Pierre Seifert

New Privacy Threat on 3G, 4G, and Upcoming 5G AKA Protocols

Ravishankar Borgaonkar and Lucca Hirschi and Shinjo Park and Altaf Shaik











Component-Based Formal Analysis of 5G-AKA: Channel Assumptions and Session Confusion





IMSI catcher in 5G?

Locating & Tracking only!


- Existing IMSI catchers will no longer be effective as encrypted IMSI
- Can we identify devices and relates to the end-users?
- Can we exploit AKA protocol vulnerabilities to track users?



Locating, Tracking & Monitoring by AKA protocol issues



AKA Protocol






5G AKA Attack



Attack vector = combination of:

- ▶ Two injections of the same (unfresh) challenge \rightsquigarrow same conceal factor AK^*
- requests of challenges are not authenticated



AUTN = C, MAC

$$C_1^* \oplus C_2^* = \mathtt{SQN}_1 \oplus \mathtt{SQN}_2$$



Demo (IMSI catcher in 5G)



Summary and Looking forward

- 5G path towards digital & gigabit society
- Stronger security than 4G but
 new features ==increase in attack surface
 support to the legacy systems == attack inheritance?
- Need of risk assessment and management tools
- Best security practices while using 5G
- New security solutions tailored towards protecting the infrastructure telemetry data













Teknologi for et bedre samfunn

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