# How to break, then fix, differential privacy on finite computers 

Or: what do you do when $x+y=$ privacy vulnerability?

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## Background: the problem



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## Background: the solution, in theory

## Differential privacy: the impact of a single person must be undetectable.



## Zooming in: floating-point numbers




## What happens to our continuous line?



## Why does this happen?

```
def add_noise(true_value, epsilon):
    sign = random.choice([-1, 1])
    u = random.uniform(0, 1)
    noise = sign * math.log(u) / epsilon
    return true_value + noise
```

This does not generate all possible floating-point values between $\mathbf{0}$ and 1!

And the "holes" propagate to the sum.

## Let's fix the noise generation!

```
def add_noise(true_value, epsilon):
    sign = random.choice([-1, 1])
    u = random.uniform(0, 1)
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    return true_value + noise
```

Attempt 1: fixing the noise generation to get a distribution without "holes".

Attempt 2: combining multiple noise samples together to make it intractable to reverse-engineer the randomness.

But... what about the sum at the very end?

## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



What if we add noise to 1.25 ? It has precision $2^{-52}$.

## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



If the noise is small...

## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



If the noise is small.. the sum's precision is at least $2^{-53}$.

## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



## Fun fact about floating-point addition...



## Takeaway: this is bad news



## How bad is this?

What can an attacker learn with a vulnerability?


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## How do we fix it?

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def add_noise(true_value, epsilon):
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```

We need to fix the entire routine, not just the noise generation!

## Four core ideas



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## Why this is neat

- Simple security proof: "just like" infinite-precision sampling + rounding!
- Fully generic: works with many distributions, adapts to other methods!
- Fast: converges quickly, especially if we generate many bits at a time -


## Takeaways

- Differential privacy can have vulnerabilities! ©
- To fix them, ad hoc approaches are not robust enough $\Theta$
- But principled approaches can be simple (and fast) enough!
- What do you need to do? Nothing - just use a library with a proven fix ©


## Shout-outs

- Authors of diffprivlib, SmartNoise Core \& OpenDP for quickly acknowledging the vulnerabilities $\mathcal{O}$
- Authors of OpenDP for fixing the vulnerabilities
- Authors of Google's DP library, for implementing another approach that comes with a privacy proof and isn't vulnerable to these attacks
- Everyone who ships open-source code allowing this kind of research


## Stay in touch!

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## Learn more!

About us: tmlt.io
About our code: tmlt.dev

